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1 CASE NO. 87 0490 CA 
Brief of the Respondent 
Jerry Lawley 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-
3(2)(h), 1953 (as amended). 
Nature of the Proceedings 
An appeal from default judgment entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Timothy Hanson, in 
favor of the Respondent, Jerry Lawley and against the 
Appellant, Valley Ford, Inc. 
Determinative Statues 
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Attached following brief.) 
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Statement of the Case 
Respondent, Jerry Lawley, filed suit in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, against 
Appellant, Valley Ford, Inc., and David Bastian, seeking to 
rescind a contract for the purchase of a Jaguar automobile 
purchased from Valley Ford, Inc., (dba Valley Jaguar) and for 
additional damages, including damages for fraud, on the part 
of Valley Ford, Inc., and/or its employees, incurred in 
connection with the sale. Facts relevant to the issue on 
appeal are as follows: 
1. Valley Ford, Inc. was served with Plaintiff-
Respondents Summons and Complaint on June 30, 1986. Service 
was accomplished by personal service upon Mr. Bryce Wade, 
Valley Ford, Inc.'s registered agent. (R.10). Mr. Wade is an 
attorney and member of the Utah State Bar. (R.14). 
2. There having been no Answer, nor other 
appropriate response to the Summons and Complaint filed by 
Plaintiff-Respondent upon Defendant-Appellant, and the time 
for answering having expired, the Default of Defendant-
Appellant was entered on July 22, 1986. (R.12). 
3. Although Defendant-Respondent's registered agent 
and attorney allegedly attempted to contact Plaintiff-
Respondent's attorney to discuss matters concerning the case, 
he admitted that there was in fact no contact between himself 
and Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney until after entry of 
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Default. (R.15) 
4. Defendant-Appellant's registered agentf s 
allegation that he had left "numerous" messages with 
Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney prior to the entry of Default 
was contradicted by the Affidavit of Claudette Mathie, 
secretary to Respondent's attorney, which Affidavit indicated 
that a review of the phone message records kept at the offices 
of Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney showed no messages were 
received from Defendant-Appellant's registered agent-attorney 
until the date of the entry of default. (R.33-35). 
5. After a period of attempts for a negotiated 
settlement, Defendant-Appellant moved the Third District Court 
to set aside Default, which Motion following a full hearing 
was denied. (R.37-39). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's refusal to set aside the Default 
of Respondent, Valley Ford, Inc., was a reasonable exercise of 
that court's discretion, based upon the Defendant's failure to 
meet its burden to show due diligence in preserving its 
rights, and based upon its further failure to show reasonable 
justification or excuse within the meaning of Rule 60(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The argument portion of appellant's brief correctly 
sets before the Court the law concerning the general issue of 
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abuse of discretion by a trial court in refusing to set aside 
a default. However, Appellant misses the mark in applying the 
law to the facts of the instant case. Each authority cited by 
Appellant requires that "reasonable justification or excuse" 
be found in the actions of the party seeking to set aside the 
default prior to a finding by the reviewing court that the 
failure to set aside a default is an abuse of the authority. 
(See e.g. Olson v. Cummingsf 565 P2d 1123, (Utah 1977) cited 
in Appellant's brief at Page 7), and that trial courts are 
endowed with discretion in deciding whether or not "reasonable 
justification or excuse" exists in the specific set of facts 
before it. Carman v. Slavens, 546 P2d 601 (Utah 1976.) 
In light of the fact that the determination of 
"reasonable justification or excuse" will depend upon 
particular fact situations before the trial court, it is not 
difficult to comprehend that differing opinions or results 
might be reached based on the specific facts before the court. 
However, once the trial court has exercised its discretion, 
that exercise of discretion will not be interfered with by the 
reviewing court unless it is clearly shown that the trial 
court acted arbitrarily and an abuse of discretion is clearly 
shown. Russell v. Martell, 681 P2d 1193 (Utah 1984). See 
also, Olson and Carmanf supra. The question is not whether 
the reviewing court agrees with the result reached by the 
court below, but whether an actual abuse" of the discretion of 
the trial court has occurred. 
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In defining abuse of discretion, C.J.S. Appeal and 
Error, Section 1583 states: 
"A reviewing court is never justified in 
substituting its discretion for that of 
the trial court; in determining whether 
the lower court has abused its discretion, 
the question is not whether the reviewing 
court agrees with the court below, but, 
rather, whether it believes that a 
judicial mind, in view of the relevant 
rules of law applicable to the particular 
case and on due consideration of all the 
circumstances could reasonably have 
reached the conclusion of the court below, 
of which complaint is made. The mere fact 
that the appellate court would have 
decided otherwise does not establish that 
the discretion has been abused..." 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed its 
adherence to the general principal stated above. In Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973), 
the Court stated: 
"The rule that the courts will incline 
towards granting relief to a party, who 
has not had the opportunity to present his 
case, is ordinarily applied at the trial 
level, and this court will not reverse the 
determination of the trial court merely 
because the motion could have been 
granted." 
More recently, the Court reiterated this principal 
in Katz v. Pierce, 732 P2d 92 (Utah 1986), wherein the Court 
stated: 
"That some basis may exist to set aside 
the default does not require the 
conclusion that the Court abused its 
discretion in refusing to do so when the 
facts and circumstances support the 
refusal. 
The reviewing court's duty is to review the record 
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for evidence that the trial court's reasoning was sound. The 
mere argument that a reason existed at the trial court level 
for the granting of the motion, and the court chose not to do 
so based on the facts and evidence before it does not amount 
to a showing of abuse of discretion. "Abuse" goes into the 
realm of the unreasonable, the illogical, the arbitrary or 
capricious. 
In the instant case, the trial court had before it 
the arguments of the parties, and the affidavits in the 
record. Based upon all of the information it had, that court 
determined that "reasonable justification or excuse" for 
Appellant-Defendantfs failure to respond did not exist. Such 
determination was a reasonable exercise of the discretion of 
the trial court, not an abuse as suggested by the Appellant. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD ACCEPT THE 
INTERPRETATION BY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
THE HEARING ON THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT. 
It is noteworthy that there is no transcript of the 
proceedings before the trial court on Appellant's Motion to 
Set Aside Default. Inasmuch as Appellant's Motion below was 
based exclusively upon arguments regarding factual matters, 
the reviewing court may rely upon the judgment of the court 
below, and that courtfs determination as to the weight and 
credibility to be given to the arguments presented by the 
parties. As noted in Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P2d 607, 608 
(Utah 1976) : 
"Appellate review of factual matters can 
be meaningful, orderly and intelligent 
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only in juxtaposition to a record by which 
lower courts1 rulings and decisions on 
disputes can be measured. In this case, 
without a transcript, no such record was 
available, and therefore, no measurement 
of the court•s actions may be urged upon 
us by Defendant." 
. . . (U)nder elementary principals of appellate 
review we:". . . presume the findings of the court 
to have been supported by admissable, competent 
substantial evidence . . . " 
In the absence of the record below, the Court of 
Appeals is justified in accepting the interpretation made by 
the trial court of the facts, arguments, and evidence before 
it. This statement of the law was reaffirmed in Fackrell v. 
Fackrell, 740 P2d 1318 (Utah 1987), and adopted and applied by 
the Court of Appeals in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P2d 238 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
The court below, as noted, had before it the 
arguments and supporting evidence offered of the parties, and 
rather than finding reasonable justification or excuse, found 
that a member of the Utah State Bar, acquainted with the 
requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was 
personally served with a Summons and Complaint and failed to 
file a timely response. The affidavit of Appellant's 
registered agent-attorney (R. 14-16) admits each of these 
elements and likewise admits that he, in fact, had no contact 
with Respondent's attorney until after the entry of default. 
There simply was no reasonable justification or excuse for 
Appellant's omissions. 
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C. THE PRIMARY CASES RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT TO 
RAISE THE ACTIONS OF ITS REGISTERED AGENT-ATTORNEY TO THE 
LEVEL OF "EXCUSABLE NEGLECT" ARE READILY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM 
THE INSTANT CASE. 
In Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P2d 1079 (Utah 
1981) the Supreme Court overturned the trial court's refusal 
to set aside a default judgment in a case where active 
negotiations between the opposing parties occurred following 
the service of a Summons and Complaint and prior to the entry 
of Default. The parties in Helgesen were in actual contact, 
and the Court found a justifiable expectation of an 
opportunity to respond on the part of the lay Defendant, who 
was not represented by counsel, and who had been promised that 
information and documentation would be provided by the 
Plaintiff, but information which was not provided prior to the 
entry of Default. 
In the case presented for review, by contrast, 
Appellant admits that no contact occurred between the parties 
following the service of the Summons and Complaint prior to 
the entry of Default. Even assuming arguendo, the accuracy of 
Appellant's assertion that its registered agent-attorney 
attempted to contact Respondent's counsel, there is nothing to 
justify an expectation on the part of the Appellant that such 
"attempts" negated its responsibility to file a timely answer. 
And while the Helgesen court suggested that certain facts and 
circumstances may justify a reliance upon what Appellant 
characterizes as "common professional courtesy", the facts in 
the instant case simply do not rise to that level. It is 
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patently unreasonable to expect such standards to be applied, 
and an automatic extension granted, when no request nor even 
any contact has been made. 
Common experience indicates that "professional 
courtesy" regarding enlargement of time for response is 
commonly extended when a request has been made. However, 
following the entry of a Default, the fact of which has 
communicated to counsel's client, expectations concerning 
individual notions of professional courtesy cannot overcome 
counsel's duty of loyalty to that attorney's own client, nor 
will they justify actions inconsistent with the interests of 
that client, particularly when the client has specifically 
instructed a particular, and legal, course of action. 
In Katz v. Piercef supra, the reviewing court found 
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in 
refusing a defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default. Once 
again in Katz, actual contact between the parties occurred 
subsequent to the service of the Summons and Complaint and 
prior to the entry of default. The court held that if the 
party seeking to set aside the default had desired additional 
time in which to present its defenses, it could have obtained 
the same by a simple request. In Katz, as in the instant 
case, the Defendant was represented by an attorney acquainted 
with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Katz court noted that Plaintiff's counsel had 
informed Defendant that a timely answer was expected failing 
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which, default would be obtained. This notification in excess 
of that contained in the Summons served upon the Defendant was 
an exercise of "professional courtesy", to be sure, however, 
it was significant only within the specific facts of Katz. 
Once again, the clear distinction between Katz and the matter 
for review is the lack of any contact between the parties. 
D. APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO ACT TO PRESERVE ITS 
RIGHTS, BASED UPON ITS ALLEGED ASSUMPTIONS, DOES NOT RISE TO 
THE LEVEL OF REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE. APPELLANT 
DID NOT EXERCISE ITS AFFIRMATIVE DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE TO 
PRESERVE IT'S RIGHTS. 
What is evident in the instant case is that 
Appellant has failed to meet its obligation to demonstrate 
that its actions should fall within the protections of Rule 
60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in determining the 
reasonableness of the conduct. A reviewing court will look to 
see whether "due diligence" was exercised by the party to 
protect the party's rights. In Airkem, supra, the Court 
articulated the moving party's duty: 
"The movant must show that he used due 
diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he 
had no control. (Emphasis in original) Id 
at 431. 
Additional language to that same effect is contained 
in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Companyf 260 P2d 741, 743 (Utah 
1953). 
Surely Appellant did not meet its burden of due 
diligence (all that was required was that an answer be filed 
and actual contact be made), and/or circumstances beyond its 
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control. The requirement of due diligence is an affirmative 
duty, and a standard to which the actions of Appellant simply 
do not attain. While it may be common professional courtesy 
to grant additional time to respond when requested, it is 
likewise common professional practice to file even a minimally 
sufficient Answer or other response, in order to preserve 
rights, when contact cannot be made with opposing counsel in 
order to request an extension. Appellant failed on both 
counts: no request was made, and no effort to file even a 
superficial response was attempted. In short, the affirmative 
duty of Appellant to act with due diligence was not met. 
E. THE KNOWLEDGE THAT MATTERS ARE IN DISPUTE WILL 
NOT JUSTIFY INACTION BY APPELLANT, NOR WILL IT REQUIRE 
EXTRAORDINARY ACTION BY RESPONDENT. 
Appellant's Brief attempts to advance the notion 
that the purported assumptions of its registered agent-
attorney regarding the availability of an extension of time 
for answer is justified based upon supposed knowledge by 
Respondent's counsel that the issues in the case were 
disputed, and that an answer should be expected. Such 
reasoning simply does not follow. 
It would not be unreasonable to assume in every case 
filed in any court of this state that the issues of those 
cases are in dispute. Were there no dispute, there would be 
no purpose for the filing. It would likewise not be 
unreasonable to assume that an Answer or other response, would 
be forthcoming in every case. There must be more, as for 
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example was present in Katz, supra, to justify a failure to 
act in response to a Summons, or to require additional action 
by the author of a Summons, than the bare knowledge that 
issues are in dispute. 
There were no ongoing settlement negotiations at 
the time of, nor were there any prior to, the filing of the 
Complaint in the instant case. There was no active 
communication between the parties. The facts are that 
Plaintiff caused Defendant to be served with a Summons and 
Complaint which stated the allegations of the Plaintiff 
against Defendant. The Summons clearly stated that an answer 
was required within twenty (20) days of service of the Summons 
upon Defendant, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and further clearly stated what the result of a 
failure to respond within the indicated time frame would be: 
the entry of default judgment for the relief demanded in the 
Complaint. Those facts lay the responsibility for action 
squarely upon the Appellant, not upon Plaintiff's counsel. 
Nothing in the law, nor in supposed expectations 
concerning "common professional courtesy", requires 
Plaintiff's counsel to act in a manner or course contrary to 
that taken. Appellant admits it was represented by counsel 
upon whom personal service was accomplished, it was not 
incumbent upon Plaintiff's counsel to advise Defendant, 
particularly when the Summons clearly stated the intentions of 
the Plaintiff. 
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F. RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS ON APPEAL• 
The instant case is appropriate for an award of 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal to Plaintiff-Respondent, 
consistent with the determination of the Court of Appeals in 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P2d 306 (Utah Ct. App 1987), wherein the 
Court applied Rule 33(a), Rules of Appellate Procedure, to 
award attorney's fees to the Respondent based upon an appeal 
taken under the Rules which was frivolous or for the purpose 
of delay. Such is clearly the case in this action. The law 
governing the matter is well settled, no abuse by the trial 
court has been shown, and the facts and evidence justifying 
the actions of the trial court are undisputed. 
The appeal is frivolous and intended only to delay 
Respondent's recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent, Jerry 
Lawley, respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals uphold 
the refusal of the court below to set aside the Default of 
Defendant, and affirm the Judgment awarded Plaintiff. 
Additionally, Respondent requests that he be awarded his costs 
on appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees, and such 
other relief as the court deems proper. 
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DATED this day of February, 1988• 
Lloyd C. Eldredge 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered 
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of 
Respondent, Jerry Lawley, to the following: Paul H. Van Dyke, 
Elggren & Van Dyke, Attorney for Appellant, 444 South State, 
Suite 201, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of 
February, 1988. 
Lloyd C. Eldredge 
Attorney for Respondent 
Id lawlford.bri 
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Rule 55 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
research under 28 USCS § 1920 or Rule 54(d), Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 24 to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A L.R. 135; Costs •» 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq 
Fed. 168. Judgment •» 1. 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative 
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his 
default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any 
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be neces-
sary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken 
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the 
nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for 
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publica-
tion or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of 
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against 
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is 
not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account 
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this 
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, 
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counter-
claim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 
54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judg-
ment by default shall be entered against the State of Utah or against an 
officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to 
relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
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Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order 
(a) Clerical Mistakes, Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders 
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from over-
sight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, 
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, 
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed 
in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Dis-
covered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the sum-
mons in an action has not been personally served upon the de-
fendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed 
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as pre-
scribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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